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HARMONIZING 18 TH CENTURY
CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES WITH 2 1 ST
CENTURY DNA TECHNOLOGY UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
BY: GIL AUSLANDER*
INTRODUCTION
Does the Fourth Amendment provide a shield against the collection of
DNA from individuals before they have been convicted? In the two centu-
ries since drafted, the Amendment has been construed, in certain instances,
more liberally to facilitate and account for advancing technology and
changes in society.' Today, deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA")2 evidence has
been used with greater frequency in the criminal justice system. The ex-
panding use of DNA evidence and, conjunctively, its collection and stor-
age, has raised issues similarly encountered with other biological samples,
although advancing technology and the nature of DNA renders complete
parallel treatment difficult.
While the United States Supreme Court has yet to consider constitutional
challenges pertaining to any form of DNA collection, circuit courts none-
theless have been unanimous in their conclusions that collecting DNA evi-
dence from convicted felons and parolees, pursuant to both federal and
state statutes, is permissible under the Fourth Amendment. 3 Recent federal
and state legislation expanded DNA collection to include individuals who
have yet to be convicted.4 Whether DNA identification techniques comport
* Gil Auslander, Juris Doctor, 2012, St. John's University School of Law.
I See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) ("It would be foolish to contend that the
degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the ad-
vance of technology . .. [we consider] what limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink the
realm of guaranteed privacy.").
2 See infra Part II.
3 See infra note 93.
4 Initially, DNA collection was restricted to individuals convicted of certain eligible federal offenc-
es. The passage of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248,
§155, 120 Stat. 587, 588 (2006); and Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-62, § 1004, 119 Stat. 2960, 2962 (2006), amended by 42 U.S.C. §
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with the requirements set forth in the Fourth Amendment is presently con-
sidered.5 Collection of DNA before conviction implicates Fourth Amend-
ment concerns more strongly than collection from convicted felons and pa-
rolees. While circuit courts are unanimous in finding post-conviction
collection to be permissible, the analyses employed are divergent, thereby
reinforcing the illation that DNA collection is still unsettled and developing
law. Nevertheless, the only two circuit court cases that directly considered
pre-conviction collection employed the same mode of analysis and con-
cluded it to be constitutional. 6
The United Kingdom has employed DNA collection with greater enthu-
siasm than the rest of Europe and United States; as a result, its experience
better apprises how DNA collection laws influence the balance in maintain-
ing law and order yet safeguarding privacy rights in a democratic society.7
The successes, failures, and incurred externalities, which are a product of
Britain's DNA collection system offers a valuable paradigm to the United
States in constructing a constitutional collection regime. Drawing on the
British experience, along with present Fourth Amendment doctrine, pre-
sented hereunder, is a proposed mode of analysis by which the collection of
DNA before conviction should be evaluated so to pass Fourth Amendment
scrutiny.8
Section II provides a general summary regarding the nature and use of
DNA. Section III delineates the existing standards considered during a
Fourth Amendment inquiry. Section IV evaluates the progeny of Fourth
Amendment cases concerning searching and seizing biological samples.
Section V emphasizes the present statutory enactment regarding pre-
14135(a), to extend DNA collection to all persons arrested/detained. See ANNA C. HENNING, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL 40077, COMPULSORY DNA COLLECTION: A FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
(Feb 16, 2010) 1 [hereinafter Henning, CRS Report].
5 While this note restricts its analysis to the Fourth Amendment, there have been multiple unsuc-
cessful challenges to DNA collection, particularly post-conviction challenges, at both the federal and
state level, pursuant to the: Fifth Amendment, Self Incrimination Clause; Fourteenth Amendment,
Equal Protection and Due Process Clause (substantive and procedural); Eighth Amendment, Cruel and
Unusual Clause; Ex Post Facto Clause of Article 1, Section 10, Clause I of the Constitution; and Sepa-
ration of Powers Theory. See D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling in Arrest, 10
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 455, 463-64 (2001); Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra Carnahan, Legal and
Policy Issue in Expanding the Scope of Law Enforcement DNA Data Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 127,
146-51 (2001).
6 See infra part VI.
7 R. (on the application of S) v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1275,
aff'd, [2004] UKHL 39) ("The power of this technique [DNA identification] to eliminate those suspect-
ed or to incriminate others is enormous."). See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) ("The
Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and sei-
zure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests
and rights of individual citizens." (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925))).
8 See infra part Vill.
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conviction DNA collection. Section VI examines United States v. Mitchell9
and United States v. Pool,10 which are currently the only precedents relat-
ing to pre-conviction DNA collection. Section VII briefly outlines the posi-
tion and analysis undertaken in the United Kingdom apropos of DNA col-
lection before conviction, with compendiary exploration of the European
Court of Human Right's treatment of the British standard. Section VIII
proposes a framework by which the curbed collection of DNA before con-
viction may be considered permissible under the Fourth Amendment by in-
corporating: existing Fourth Amendment doctrines; present Fourth
Amendment treatment relating to biological samples; and some of the
standards enacted in the United Kingdom.
I. DNA's DEFINITION AND ITS USE AND ANALYSIS IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM:
All animals, including humans, are composed of cells and the nucleus
controls the activities of the cell, serving as the "command center."11 The
nucleus contains deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA"), which is a living crea-
ture's hereditary material and is present in nearly every cell. 12 DNA13 pro-
vides the blueprint for each and every living creature's genetic makeup.14
9 681 F. Supp. 2d. 597 (W.D.Pa. 2009), rev'den banc, 652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011).
10 645 F. Supp. 2d. 903 (E.D.Cal. 2009), aff'd, 621 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2010), petition for en banc
granted, 646 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated as moot, 659 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding vacatur
on account of defendant Pool's plea of guilty, which rendered case moot and necessitating dismissal
because of absence of a live controversy). See infra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
11 See JEFFREY L. WITHERLY ET AL., AN A TO Z OF DNA SCIENCE 21 (Cold Spring Harbor Labor-
atory Press) (2001); see also Alec Rice, Brave New Circuit: Creeping Towards DNA Database Dystopia
in US. v. Weikert, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 691, 693 (2009); U.S. National Library of Medi-
cine, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE , at 5 (2012), available at http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook.pdf [here-
inafter U.S. Library of Medicine: Genetics].
12 Witherly, supra note 11, at 34; DNA Initiative, Forensic DNA of Officers of the Court 5 (Mar.
16, 2009) (course outline (pdf), available http://nij.gov/training/courses/dna-officers-court.htm) [herein-
after DNA Pamphlet for Officers of the Court].
13 DNA is comprised of nucleotide chains in a double helix formation. See Witherly, supra note
11, at 12. Nucleotides are composed of a nitrogen base, sugar and phosphate, where the nitrogen bases
couple to form base pairs, (bases Adenine and Thymine and bases Cytosine and Guanine), and the base
pairs bond to alternating sugar and phosphate molecules. Id. "The structure of DNA is like a ladder with
the base pairs forming the rungs of the ladder. The entire ladder is twisted upon itself like a spiral stair-
case to from the double helix[.]" Pamphlet for Officers of the Court, supra note 12, at 7. The precise
order and sequence of bases instructs as to specific biological characteristics or processes, which is
"similar to the way in which letters of the alphabet appear in a certain order to from words and sentenc-
es." U.S. Library of Medicine: Genetics, supra note 11, at 9; see also American Prosecutors Research
Institute, Forensic DNA Fundamentals for the Prosecutor, 3-4, (2003), available at
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/forensic-dna fundamentals.pdf) [hereinafter APRI].
14 See Witherly, supra note 11, at 37; see also NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL
32247, DNA TESTING FOR LAw ENFORCEMENT: LEGISLATIVE ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 [hereinafter
James, CRS Report]; COLLEEN FITZPATRICK & ANDREW YEISER, DNA & GENEALOGY 1 (Rice Book
Press) (2005).
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Within DNA there exists two general types of regions: coding and non-
coding.15 Coding regions, identified as genes,16 provide direction for the
creation of proteins, which bestow a specific biological function or charac-
teristic..17 Non-coding regions, commonly identified as "junk DNA," are
segments of DNA that do not instruct as to the creation of specific pro-
teins.18 "Junk DNA" does not produce, regulate, or impart identifying char-
acteristics, predispositions, or features of a particular individual.19 This is
not to suggest that "junk DNA" is useless; research suggests that "'junk
DNA' may play a role in proper embryonic development." 20 In humans,
approximately 97% of DNA is considered "junk DNA."21
An "organism's complete set of DNA is called its genome." 22 The DNA
across humans is approximately 99.90% identical, 23 although in the re-
maining 00.10% exists small variations known as polymorphisms, 24 which
account for the differences among different humans and are entirely unique
to each person. 25 "DNA analysis" 26 exploits these differences by using the-
se unique variations as a signature by which to identify individuals. 27
15 Pamphlet for Officers of the Court, supra note 12, at 8. See Rice, supra note 11, at 694.
16 Strands of particular nucleotide base sequences are known as genes and groups of genes are
known as chromosomes. See Witherly, supra note 11, at 24, 45. A human has twenty-three pairs of
chromosomes (total of forty-six), between 20,000 to 25,000 genes, and 3,147 million nucleotides pairs.
Id at 24. Fitzpatrick & Yeiser, supra note 14, at 7-8.
17 See U.S. Library of Medicine: Genetics, supra note 11, at 23; Pamphlet for Officers of the Court,
supra note 12, at 8; Witherly, supra note 11, at 45.
18 Fitzpatrick & Yeiser, supra note 14, at 3-4. See Pamphlet for Officers of the Court, supra note
12, at 8.
19 Fitzpatrick & Yeiser, supra note 14, at 3-4; See Pamphlet for Officers of the Court, supra note
12, at 8.
20 FITZPATRICK & YEISER, supra note 14, at 3-4.
21 Id. at 3; FORENSIC SCIENCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SCIENTIFIC AND INVESTIGATIVE
TECHNIQUES 711 (Stuart H. James & Jon J. Nordby eds., CRC Press 3d ed. 2009).
22 Nat'l Human Research Inst., Nat'l Insts. of Health, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. (Oct.
19, 2011), A Brief Guide to Genomics, http://www.genome.gov/pfy.cfn?pagelD-18016863;
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 800 (28th ed. 2006) ("The total gene complement of a set of chro-
mosomes found in higher life forms.") (emphasis added).
23 APRI, supra note 13, at 3; Tracey Maclin, Part I. Is Obtaining an Arrestee's DNA a Valid Spe-
cial Needs Search Under the Fourth Amendment? What Should (and Will) the Supreme Court Do?, 34
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 165, 165 n.7 (2006); FITZPATRICK & YEISER, supra note 14, at 8.
24 JEFFREY L. WITHERLY ET AL., AN A TO Z OF DNA SCIENCE 99 (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory
Press 2001) ("A common variation is the sequence of DNA among individuals ... a gene that exists in
more than one version"). See APRI, supra note 13, at 34 ("The existence of more than one possible al-
lele at a given locus; genetic variance.").
25 Maclin, supra note 23, at 165 n7; MICHAEL D. CALDWELL ET AL., PHARMACOGENETICS &
PHARMACOGENOMICS 3 (Russ D. Altman et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2012).
26 Defined per 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(c)(2) (2006) as the "analysis of the deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) identification information in a bodily sample."
27 Maclin, supra note 23, at 166; FORENSIC SCIENCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SCIENTIFIC AND
INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES 705 (Stuart H. James & Jon J. Nordby eds., CRC Press 3d ed. 2009).
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As used in the criminal justice system, 28 DNA comes from four main
sources: (1) crime scene samples;29 (2) samples from unidentified bod-
ies/homicide victims; 30 (3) samples from known individuals; 31 and (4)
"abandoned" public samples. 32 As DNA is found in almost every cell, a
"DNA sample" 33 can be readily obtained from most cells. 34 Once a sample
is collected and analyzed, the information, known as a profile, is loaded in-
to a DNA database.
DNA profiles are entered into the National DNA Index System (NDIS),
which is a part of the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS).35 NDIS is
the federal DNA database and contains profiles collected by federal, state,
and local law enforcement. 36 As a result, investigators in multiple jurisdic-
tions can integrate "their respective investigations and share leads[.]" 37 A
28 Nat'l Inst. of Justice, DNA Evidence Basics (Aug. 9, 2012),
http://www.nij.gov/nij/topics/forensics/evidence/dna/basics/welcome.htm; Nat'I Comm'n on the Future
of DNA Evidence, Nat'l Inst. of Justice, What Every Law Enforcement Officer Should Know About
DNA Evidence, at 2 https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/bc000614.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2012).
29 DNA present at crime scenes may be collected from: bloodstains dried/liquid semen
stains/residue, genital samples collected from rape victims, shed hairs, pieces of tissue/skin, or clothing.
Nat'l Inst. of Justice, DNA Evidence Basics: Types of Samples Suitable for DNA Testing (Aug. 9, 2012),
http://www.nij.gov/nij/topics/forensics/evidence/dnalbasics/types-of-samples.htm [hereinafter DNA
Evidence Basics]. See also What Every Law Enforcement Officer Should Know About DNA Evidence,
supra note 28, at 3.
30 DNA samples from unidentified bodies/homicide victims and samples from known individuals
typically involve collection directly from the person's body. The collected biological sample may be
from: blood, saliva (oral epithelial cells), or skin (plucked hairs). Id A sample when taken from a de-
ceased individual may also include for example: teeth, tissue from internal organs, or fingernails. Id.
See also What Every Law Enforcement Officer Should Know About DNA Evidence, supra note 28, at 3.
31 A standard form of DNA collection directly from a person's body is through a buccal swab.
DNA Evidence Basics. A buccal swab consists of a "[s]terile swabs or other buccal collection devices
[...] rubbed against the inside cheek of the individual's mouth to collect epithelial cells for analysis."
Nat'l Forensic Science Tech. Ctr., Reference Sample Collection (last visited Sept. 1, 2012),
http://www.nfstc.org/pdi/Subject0l/pdis01_mO_05_a.htm. See also What Every Law Enforcement
Officer Should Know About DNA Evidence, supra note 28, at 3.
32 "Abandoned" public samples are items where biological material may have been deposited.
Such items include: cigarette butts, facial tissues, condoms, gum, or fingemail clippings. Moreover,
such items may have been "abandoned" at crime scenes. DNA Evidence Basics, supra note 29. See also
What Every Law Enforcement Officer Should Know About DNA Evidence, supra note 28, at 3.
33 Defined per 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(c)(1) (2006) as "a tissue, fluid, or other bodily sample of an
individual on which a DNA analysis can be carried out."
34 DNA Evidence Basics, supra note 29. CRS Report James, supra note 14, at 1.
35 James, CRS Report, supra note 14, at 1-2. See Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the
CODIS Program and the National DNA Index System, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis (last visit-
ed Sept. 1, 2012) [hereinafter CODIS & NDIS]. CODIS is the federal umbrella program that directs the
application of DNA in the criminal justice system and organizes the databases and software that are part
of the DNA system. As of July 2012, NDIS "contains over 9,812,000 offender profiles, 1,181,300 ar-
restee profiles and 441,200 forensic profiles . . .. [and] "has produced over 185,500 hits [thus] assisting
in more that 177,500 investigations." CODIS-NDIS Statistics (last visited Sept. 1, 2012),
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/ndis-statistics.
36 CODIS & NDIS, supra note 35; DNA Evidence Basics, supra note 28. See Maclin, supra note
23, at 166.
37 CODIS & NDIS Statistics, supra note 3 1.
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profile does not contain any identifying information; the only information
stored is the: (1) DNA profile; (2) agency that submitted the DNA sample;
(3) sample identification number; and (4) laboratory responsible for analyz-
ing the sample. 38 Ultimately, the profile derived from analyzing DNA is
"expressed as a set of numbers," not a textual description about an individ-
ual.39
DNA is analyzed by examining particular areas of DNA, known as loci,
which are specific locations at one of the two pairs of twenty-three chro-
mosomes (forty-six total), which comprise human DNA.40 DNA analysis
examines specific loci to identify polymorphisms, which is a variant form
of a gene's sequence of nucleotides at a specific locus. 41 A person's unique
genetic signature arises from the existence polymorphisms at particular lo-
ci.42 A DNA profile is a scientific determination, expressed as a probability
ratio, derived from evaluating thirteen loci and noting the frequency of in-
dividualized polymorphisms found at each of the analyzed loci.43
The CODIS system employs thirteen core loci for DNA analysis. 44 The
strength of the identification is strong because the probability of two unre-
lated people having the same profile, after analyzing the standard thirteen
loci, yields a probability of "one in 180 trillion." 45 By comparing DNA col-
lected from a suspect, to DNA found on evidence at a crime scene, law en-
forcement can potentially identify the perpetrator46 because of the infinites-
imal probability of the DNA profile being duplicated by another randomly.
selected individual in society.
Importantly, the thirteen standard loci used by CODIS are considered
"junk DNA."47 These thirteen loci do not correspond to DNA sequences
that impart identifying characteristics or features of a particular individual.
38 CODIS & NDIS, supra note 35; see also United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2007)
(describing the limited information contained in each DNA profile on CODIS).
39 Kaye, supra note 5, at 462; see also Rice supra note 11, at 695.
40 Pamphlet for Officers of the Court, supra note 12, at 8-11 see also APRI, supra note 13, at 11;
Rice supra note 11, at 695.
41 APRI, supra note 13, at 5 ("A gene's position on a chromosome is its locus. The possible se-
quences or variations of a gene are called 'alleles.' . . . Genes may be "polymorphic," meaning they
may take different forms or contain different sequences of base pairs."). See Pamphlet for Officers of
the Court, supra note 12, at 9; DNA Evidence Basics, supra note 28.
42 See Pamphlet for Officers of the Court, supra note 12, at 10; see also Maclin, supra note 23, at
166 (noting that a DNA profiles loci are used to identify a match in CODIS).
43 Pamphlet for Officers of the Court, supra note 12, at 11. See DNA Evidence Basics, supra note
28; Rice supra note 11, at 695; APRI, supra note 13, at 9.
44 APRI, supra note 13, at 9; see Maclin, supra note 23, at 166.
45 Kaye, supra note 5, at 461 n.20.
46 Id. at 462; see also United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2007).
47 See CODIS & NDIS, supra note 35; Kaye, supra note 5, at 462 (stating that the DNA infor-
mation stored in databases does not disclose many types of information about individuals).
850
2013] HARMONIZING 18 m CENTURY CONSTiTUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES
For example, they do not reveal an individual's predisposition to diseases,
conditions, or mental functioning.48 By using "junk DNA," law enforce-
ment ensures that collected DNA is used for identification purposes in the
least invasive manner.
II. PRESENT FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINES:
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures
unless supported by a warrant based on probable cause. 49 Drafted when the
abuses of the crown were still fresh in the minds of the founding fathers,
the Fourth Amendment was designed to serve as a guarantee against arbi-
trary and invasive acts taken by the government and associates acting at the
behest of the government.50 Its intention is to protect individuals against
unreasonable government searches, 51 which is presumed when an individu-
al has an expectation of privacy and society concedes that such an expecta-
tion of privacy is reasonable. 52 Conjunctively, a seizure pertains to the
meaningful restriction on the possessory interest or free movement of prop-
erty.5 3 Searches interfere with privacy rights whereas seizures implicate
property rights.54 Accordingly, the "Fourth Amendment does not proscribe
all searches and seizures, but only those that are unreasonable." 55 As such,
the touchstone of the court's Fourth Amendment analysis is "'the reasona-
bleness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of
a citizen's personal security."' 56 Searches and seizures are evaluated under
one of three categories of analysis: 57 (1) probable cause, (2) reasonable
48 See CODIS & NDIS, supra note 35; Kaye, supra note 5, at 462.
49 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
50 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989); see also John D. Biancamano,
Arresting DNA: The Evolving Nature of DNA Collection Statutes and their Fourth Amendment Justifi-
cations, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 619, 630 (2009) (outlining the Supreme Court's longstanding treatment of the
Fourth Amendment's protection of society's reasonable expectation of privacy).
51 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 255
(1960).
52 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
The reasonableness of the privacy expectation implicates the type of evidence, the circumstances under
which it was gathered, and the person from who it was gathered. Henning, CRS Report, supra note 4, at
6.
53 Henning, CRS Report, supra note 4, at 5; see Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 (1981).
54 Henning, CRS Report, supra note 4, at 5.
55 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619; see also Rothstein & Carnahan, supra note 5, at 133 ("[while] noncon-
sensual searches conducted outside the judicial process are per se unreasonable, nothing in the Fourth
Amendment expressly prohibits government searches without a warrant.").
56 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 821 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)); see also United States v.
Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2007).
57 Henning, CRS Report, supra note 4, at 6-7.
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suspicion, or (3) suspicionless searches. 58 The reasonableness and constitu-
tionality of pre-conviction DNA collection are assessed under a
suspicionless search regime.
Suspicionless searches are "general search regimes free from the usual
warrant and probable-cause requirements," 59 and are applicable when "the
burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the government's pur-
pose behind the search." 60 Suspicionless search regimes have been epito-
mized by several key categories: excepted areas,61 administrative searches,
"special needs" searches, and "totality-of-the-circumstances" searches. 62
The "special needs" exception permits a search without a warrant if it
involves circumstances beyond normal law enforcement that "make the
warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable." 63 This involves
balancing competing private and public interests. 64 The special needs ex-
ception has generally been reserved for search regimes "designed to serve
'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.' 65
Recently in United States v. Knights66 and Samson v. California,67 the
United States Supreme Court considered the "totality-of-the-
circumstances" search regime, emphasizing the status of the person
searched. 68 Both found reasonable, under the Fourth Amendment, the war-
rantless search of a probationer and parolee respectively. 69 Analysis under
5 8 Id.
59 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 822.
60 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523,
533 (1967)).
61 Certain areas, inter alia, airports, see United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500-01 (2d Cir.
1974), border interfaces, see United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 617-19 (1972) and prisons, see
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1983), are considered beyond the typical probable-cause re-
quirements of the Fourth Amendment.
62 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 822-24.
63 MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 267-68 (2d Cir. 2006) (considering whether the government
could implement a random, suspicionless search program to guard against a terrorist attack on mass
transportation facilities).
6 Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 2006). The exception has four parts: (i) the charac-
ter and degree of the government intrusion, (ii) the nature of the privacy interests involved, (iii) the na-
ture and immediacy of the government interest, and (iv) the effectiveness of the policy in advancing the
government interest. Id. at 78; see Lynch v. City of New York, 589 F.3d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 2009).
65 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,37-38, 41 (2000); see also Rice, supra note 11, at
704 (acknowledging that the special needs doctrine is to be applies only when the activity at issues has
a "primary purpose other than catching or deterring offenders").
66 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
67 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
68 See Samson, 547 U.S. at 848-49; Knights, 534 U.S. at 119; see also Henning, CRS Report, supra
note 4, at 6-7.
69 Knights, 534 U.S. at 119; Samson, 547 U.S. at 847, 850 ("a condition of release can so diminish
or eliminate a released prisoner's reasonable expectation of privacy that a suspicionless search by a law
enforcement officer would not offend the Fourth Amendment.").
852
2013] HARMONZING 18m CENTURY CONSTTUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES
the "totality-of-the-circumstances" test requires balancing the extent to
which an individual's privacy interests are breached, against the extent to
which this intrusion is necessary to advance a legitimate government inter-
est.70 The balancing of these "considerations requires no more than reason-
able suspicion to conduct a search .. . The degree of individualized suspi-
cion required of a search is a determination of when there is a sufficiently
high probability that criminal conduct is occurring to make the intrusion
on the individual's privacy interest reasonable."71
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT As APPLIED To BIOLOGICAL SAMPLES
During the twentieth century, cases developed concerning whether and
to what extent Fourth Amendment protections are triggered in the search
and seizure of biological samples. The opening clause of the Fourth
Amendment, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their person, houses,
papers, and effects," 72 prefaces what is to be protected "against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures." 73 There existed in English common law seldom
if any cases concerning searches and seizures of biological samples, 74 alt-
hough the spirit and intent of the Amendment, along with the words, "se-
cure in their persons," 75 evinces that biological samples are to be afforded
Fourth Amendment protection. Applying Katz7 6 requires considering, most
prominently, whether society would recognize an expectation of privacy in
the implicated biological sample. 77 Implicit in this threshold inquiry, it is
necessary to evaluate: "(1) the extent to which the material is displayed to
the public, (2) the extent of the bodily invasion caused by the sampling
procedure, and (3) the nature of the information that can be extracted from
the sample." 78 This framework informs how DNA collection is to be ana-
lyzed in relation to the Fourth Amendment. Applying existing precedent on
70 Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-19; Samson, 547 U.S. at 848.
71 Knights, 534 U.S. at 121 (emphasis added) ("Although the Fourth Amendment ordinarily re-
quires the degree of probability embodied in the term 'probable cause,' a lesser degree satisfies the
Constitution when the balance of governmental and private interests makes such a standard reasona-
ble.").
72 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
73 Id.
74 Rice, supra note 11, at 701 ("[T]he practice of taking, measuring, and comparing human DNA
samples is not clearly analogous to any of the searches and seizures contemplated by the Founders at
the time of the Constitution was drafted.").
75 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
76 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
77 United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 756 (9th Cir. 1991); see Kaye, supra note 5, at 473.
78 Kaye, supra note 5, at 473.
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biological samples relating to fingerprints, 79 blood,80 salvia, skin, voice ex-
emplars, 81 and handwriting exemplars, 82 without reference to an exception
or amended standard of permissibility, the collection of DNA has been held
to be a search and seizure. 83
In determining the appropriateness of collecting a biological sample,
courts consider the invasiveness of the procedure needed to obtain the sam-
ple. Invasiveness is measured by the extent to which the sought biological
samples are otherwise displayed to the public. For example, fluids that flow
in the body, such as blood, urine, and saliva, which require piercing bodily
tissue or entering a bodily cavity, imbue an expectation of privacy and can-
not be inspected or extracted absent implicating the protections of the
Fourth Amendment. 84 Conversely, voice and handwriting exemplars are
not afforded an expectation of privacy because the tone and manner of a
voice are continuously produced for the public to hear.85 Fingerprints,
while technically displayed to the public and not requiring invasive proce-
dure to obtain,86 still are afforded minimal Fourth Amendment protections
79 Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726 (1969); see also Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816-17
(1985) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment would permit seizures for the purpose of fingerprinting, if there is
reasonable suspicion that the suspect has committed a criminal act, if there is a reasonable basis for be-
lieving that fingerprinting will establish or negate the suspect's connection with that crime, and if the
procedure is carried out with dispatch."); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 11 (1973) ("For in Da-
vis it was the initial seizure-the lawless dragnet detention-that violated the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, not the taking of the fingerprints.").
80 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966) (holding that a physician may extract blood,
absent consent, from a suspect at a hospital believed to be involved in drunk driving).
81 Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 14 ("The physical characteristics of a person's voice, its tone and manner,
as opposed to the content of a specific conversation, are constantly exposed to the public. Like a man's
facial characteristics, or handwriting, his voice is repeatedly produced for others to hear. No person can
have a reasonable expectation that others will not know the sound of his voice, any more than he can
reasonably expect that his face will be a mystery to the world.").
82 United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973) ("Handwriting, like speech, is repeatedly shown
to the public, and there is no more expectation of privacy in the physical characteristics of a person's
script than there is in the tone of his voice.").
83 See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) ("We have
long recognized that a compelled intrusion into the body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content
must be deemed a Fourth Amendment search."); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985) ("The rea-
sonableness of surgical intrusions beneath the skin depends on a case-by-case approach, in which the
individual's interests in privacy and security are weighed against society's interests in conducting the
procedure."); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767-68; see also United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 406 (3d
Cir. 2011) ("Neither party disputes that the collection of a DNA sample constitutes an invasion of pri-
vacy that is subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment, and we have so held."); Nicolas v.
Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 2005).
84 Kaye, supra note 5, at 477 ("An inspection or extraction that penetrates the body or enters its
cavities usually is regarded as infringing a reasonable expectation or privacy and hence falling within
the zone of the Fourth Amendment."); see Rothstein & Carnahan, supra note 5, at 135.
85 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967); Kaye, supra note 5, at 475.
86 Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (noting that fingerprints do not gravely intrude
on an individual's personal privacy and when secured are more reliable and accurate at assisting in
criminal investigations); United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1932) ("We prefer, however, to
rest our decision upon the general right of the authorities charged with the enforcement of the criminal
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and may not be obtained absent some level of suspicion.87
The Court in Winston v. Lee,88 memorialized that a case-by case ap-
proach is warranted to evaluate the reasonableness of procedures that ex-
tract internal biological samples, by considering an "individual's interests
in privacy and security" balanced "against society's interests in conducting
the procedure."89 Factors illuminating this balancing include: (1) the extent
to which the proposed course of action may place in jeopardy the safety or
health of the individual, 90 (2) the "extent of intrusion upon the individual's
dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity," (3) the "com-
munity's interest in fairly and accurately determining guilt or innocence." 91
Recent treatment as to the constitutionality of DNA collection has fo-
cused on its collection post-conviction.92 All United States Circuit Courts
that have considered collection post-conviction have "arrived at the same
conclusion: that the federal DNA Act and its State law analogues survive
Fourth Amendment scrutiny." 93
law to employ finger printing as an appropriate means to identify criminals and detect crime.").
87 Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816-17 (1985); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 4 (1973).
88 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (finding that requiring an individual to undergo a surgical procedure under
general anesthesia would be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
89 Id. at 760.
90 Winston, 470 U.S. at 761-62. Substantial weight in opposition was accorded to a procedure that
carried an unjustifiable risk of endangering an individual's life and health, when finding it unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment for the petitioner to undergo a surgical procedure. This was juxtaposed
against Schmerber where it was noted that a blood test was a typical and common procedure and there-
fore "Schmerber recognized society's judgment that blood tests do not constitute an unduly extensive
imposition on an individual's personal privacy and bodily integrity." Id. at 762.
91 Id.
92 Extensive discussion of collection post-conviction implicates various similar and differing con-
cerns that ultimately are beyond the scope of this note.
93 See Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178, 1183 (10th Cir. 2007); see also United States v.
Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2007). Despite finding the post-conviction DNA collection constitu-
tional under the Fourth Amendment, there is a split in the circuits as to which is the appropriate stand-
ard. The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits have applied
the "totality-of-circumstances" test, see United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924-25 (8th Cir. 2006);
Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184
(3d Cir. 2005); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Kincade, 379
F.3d 813, 830-31 (9th Cir. 2004); Groceman v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413-14 (5th Cir.
2004); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 305-07 (4th Cir. 1992), whereas the Second, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits have applied the "special-needs" test, see United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73 (2d Cir.
2007), United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 773 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d
1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003), Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2004); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d
72 (2d Cir. 1999). Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has abstained from adopting either the "totality-of-
circumstances" test or the "special-needs" test, instead merely holding the DNA Act constitutional un-
der the Fourth Amendment, see United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 679-81 (6th Cir. 2006).
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IV. PRESENTLY ENACTED UNITED STATES STATUTES CONCERNING THE
COLLECTION OF DNA
The federal statutory scheme apropos of DNA collection and use is
promulgated at 42 U.S.C. § 14131-14136.94 Moreover, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1), 95 the Department of Justice ("DOJ") has the author-
ity to implement regulations that require federal agencies to "collect DNA
samples from individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or convict-
ed . . .. "96
The federal DNA system, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a), provides
that a DNA index may be established to keep "identification records" of
"persons convicted of crimes" and "persons who have been charged in an
indictment or information with a crime."97 Additionally, the same provision
also proscribes that the index may include DNA samples recovered from
crime scenes, unidentified human remains, and samples voluntarily con-
tributed from relatives of missing persons. 98 Furthermore, DNA records
may be expunged provided that evidence is imparted that the offense which
triggered the collection was overturned, dismissed, resulted in an acquittal,
or that no changes were filed against the individual within the appropriate
time period. 99 Privacy protections are delineated at 42 U.S.C. § 14133(b-c),
which specifically curtails to whom the information stored in the DNA in-
dex may be disclosed and provides for criminal penalties for wrongful dis-
closure. The "results of DNA tests performed for a Federal law enforce-
ment agency for law enforcement purpose,"oo may only be disclosed to
three exclusive destinations: criminal justice agencies, judicial proceeding,
and criminal defense purposes.lol The statute sets forth strict penalties, in-
cluding incarceration and fines of up $250,000 for unlawful disclosure and
acquirement of DNA samples or information. 102
The section concerning pre-conviction DNA collection is codified at 42
U.S.C. § 14135a, memorializing that "DNA samples [may be collected]
94 42 U.S.C. § 14131-14136.
95 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, §155, 120 Stat.
587, 588 (2006), and DNA Fingerprinting Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162 § 1004 (2005), are codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1).
96 Collection of DNA Samples, 28 C.F.R. § 28.12 (2009); DNA-Sample Collection and Biological
Evidence Preservation in the Federal Jurisdiction, 28 C.F.R. § 28.12 (2009).
97 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a)(1) (2006).
98 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a)(2-4) (2006).
99 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d) (2006).
100 42 U.S.C. § 14133(b)(1) (2006).
101 42 U.S.C. § 14133(b)(1)(A-C) (2006).
102 42 U.S.C. § 14133(c)(2) (2006).
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from individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted. . . ."1o3
This is buttressed by an administrative regulation compiled by the DOJ
prescribing that: "[a]ny agency of the United States that arrests or detains
individuals or supervises individuals facing charges shall collect DNA
samples from individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or convict-
ed . . .. "104 Failure to comply with this provision is itself a crime. 05 The
collection of DNA is authorized from uncooperative people by "such
means as are reasonably necessary to detain, restrain, and collect a DNA
sample . .. "106
V. THE MINIMAL JUDICIAL TREATMENT THUS FAR CONCERNING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DNA COLLECTION BEFORE CONVICTION
While the jurisprudence concerning the constitutionality of DNA collec-
tion has until recently been confined to post-conviction and probationary
release, two circuit court cases10 7 in 2009-2011, United States v. Mitch-
elo108 and United States v. Pool,109 addressed the issue of pre-conviction
DNA collectionl1 o and reached homogeneous conclusions. Both courts
103 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
104 28 C.F.R. § 28.12(b) (2012) (emphasis added). This DOJ regulations delineate that DNA sam-
ples are to be collected "utilizing sample collection kits ... including approved methods of blood draws
or buccal swabs." 28 C.F.R. § 28.12(f)(1) (2012). Moreover, 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d) (2006) outlines that
any felony, crime of violence, or attempt or conspiracy to commit a felony or crime of violence, quali-
fies to require the collection of DNA.
105 42 U.S.C. §14135a(a)(5) (2006).
106 42 U.S.C. §14135a(a)(4)(A) (2006). 28 C.F.R. §28.12(d) (2012) parallels with identical lan-
guage concerning the attainment of DNA samples for uncooperative individuals.
107 Recently in United States v. Thomas, 2011 WL 1599641, at *13 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2011), the
District Court for the Western District of New York found the collection of DNA before conviction to
be constitutional under the Fourth Amendment, albeit under the special needs doctrine. Importantly, the
court noted the "dearth of authority" on pre-conviction DNA collection. Id First, the court found that
DNA collection for identification served a special need. Id. at *18. Next the court proceeded by apply-
ing the prongs of the special needs doctrine, in which the ensuing analysis mirrored the totality-of-the
circumstances analysis that found pre-conviction DNA collection constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment. Id.
108 681 F. Supp. 2d 597 (W.D. Pa. 2009), rev'den banc, 652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011).
109 645 F. Supp. 2d 903 (W.D. Tex. 2009), af'd 621 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2010), petition for en
banc granted, 646 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated as moot, 659 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding
vacatur on account of defendant Pool's plea of guilty, which rendered case moot and necessitating dis-
missal because of the absence of "live controversy"); see infra notes 145-151 and accompanying text.
110 Both Mitchell and Pool were arrested and indicted by a grand jury. When arraigned, after
pleading not guilty, they were released on bond, but ordered to obey certain pre-trial conditions, includ-
ing providing a DNA sample. Pool challenged provisions of the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §3142(b)
(2006) and 18 U.S. C. §3142(c)(1)(A) (2006). Pool, 621 F.3d at 1215. This statute prescribes "that [a]
person cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample ... if the collection of such a sample is authorized
pursuant to [42 U.S.C. 14135a (2006)]." 18 U.S.C. §3142(c)(1)(A) (2006). Therefore, Pool derivatively
challenged 42 U.S.C. § 14135a (2006) considered herein. In contrast, Mitchell directly challenged 42
U.S.C. § 14135a (2006). Mitchell, 681 F. Supp 2d. at 599-600.
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subscribed to the application of the "totality-of-the-circumstances" test
when considering the constitutionality of post-arrest-pre-conviction DNA
collection. II1
In Mitchell, the Third Circuit sitting en banc, reversed the District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania,' 12 finding that DNA collection
from arrestees is reasonable and does not violate the Fourth Amendment on
account of arrestees' "diminished expectation of privacy in their identities,
and [that] DNA collection from arrestees serves important law enforcement
interests." 1l3 Mitchell was indicted for attempting to possess with intent to
distribute cocaine and challenged the pretrial collection of DNA after the
Government made a request pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14135a and 28 C.F.R.
§ 28.12.114
Evaluating the scope of intrusion occasioned by DNA collection, under
the "totality-of-the-circumstances" test, the court found that physical col-
lection of DNA-via a buccal swab-amounted to a minimal invasion of
privacy.11 5 In light of past precedent sanctioning collection of biological
samples such as blood, the court did not view DNA collection to be a sig-
nificant intrusion on privacy.1 6 The court expressly noted how society is
accustomed to blood tests, how the quantity of blood drawn is minimal, and
how drawing blood involves no risk to health or life-resulting in little or
no pain."l7 Thus, in contrast, DNA collection is less invasive then veni-
puncture because buccal swabs, the typical means of collecting DNA, do
not require puncturing flesh and instead merely require swabbing the inside
of a subject's mouth-a natural bodily cavity. 118
Next, with regard to the search that arises from analyzing collected DNA
samples in order to render a DNA profile, the court opined that the
"amount and type of personal information to be contained in the DNA pro-
Ill Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 390 ("[W]e apply a 'totality of the circumstances' test, balancing the in-
trusion on Mitchell's privacy against the Government's interest in the collection and testing of his
DNA."); Pool, 621 F.3d at 1218 ("[The special needs test was] developed in cases outside of the law
enforcement context and the Supreme Court has been leery of applying it to criminal cases . . . . [and]
precedent directs [the court] to apply the totality of the circumstances test.").
112 Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 610 ("In assessing the totality of the circumstances and weighing
the legitimate governmental interests against Mitchell's expectation of privacy . .. the Court finds that a
universal requirement that a charged defendant submit a DNA sample for analysis and inclusion in a
law enforcement databank ... is unreasonable under, and therefore in violation of, the Fourth Amend-
ment.").
113 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 390.
114 Id.; Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 610.
115 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 390.
116 Id. at 406-07 ("[Bucccal swabs are] less invasive than venipuncture ... [and thus the] act of
collecting a DNA sample is neither a significant nor an unusual intrusion.").
117 Id. at 406.
118 Id
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file to be nominal." 1 9 The Third Circuit majority rejected defendant
Mitchell's contention regarding the potential misuse of information con-
tained in DNA samples.120 While acknowledging an individual's privacy
interests in the extensive information contained in DNA, the court parried
defendant Mitchell's concerns, concluding that the criminal penalties for
impermissible use of DNA samples/profiles, the limited statutory mandate
for DNA collection, along with the use of "junk DNA" for analysis, offered
sufficient safeguards.121
Furthermore, the Mitchell Court's majority ruling, in contrast to their
dissenting brethren and the District Court, rested heavily on equating DNA
collection with fingerprinting.122 The court concluded that DNA profiles
are twenty-first century fingerprints1 23 because they are "used solely as an
accurate, unique, identifying marker." 24 Particularly, DNA profiles, like
fingerprints, only provide a record of an individual's identity, and "CODIS
operates much like an old-fashioned fingerprint database (albeit more effi-
ciently)" 25 in providing information exclusively for identification.126
Moreover, it expressly recognized how DNA profiles are derived from
"junk DNA," which do not reveal any private medical and genealogical in-
formation with which an individual-like defendant Mitchell-is con-
cerned.127
The Court explicitly noted that an individual does not have an expecta-
tion of privacy in their identity, particularly after a finding of probable
cause. 128 Continually, it acknowledged that the complete ambit of rights
and unrestricted liberty, recognized by the general public, is circumscribed
well before conviction. 129 Upon arrest and until disposition, a defendant's
119 Id at 409.
120 Id. at 408.
121 Id. at 407-08 ("[E]very one of our sister circuits to have considered the concerns raised by
Mitchell has rejected them given their speculative nature and the safeguards attendant to DNA collec-
tion and analysis . . .. The mere possibility of such misuse can be accorded only limited weight in a
balancing analysis that focuses on present circumstances . . . . These criminal penalties offer a 'substan-
tial deterrent to such hypothetical abuse' of the kind advanced by Mitchell.").
122 See id. at 425 (Rendell, J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 410 ("DNA profiles as sanitized 'genetic fingerprints' that can be used to identify an in-
dividual uniquely, but do not disclose an individual's traits, disorders, or dispositions.").
124 Id. at 410.
125 Id. at 409.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 411-12.
129 See id. at 411 ("'[P]robable cause had already supplied the basis for bringing the person within
the criminal justice system. With the person's loss of liberty upon arrest comes the loss of at least some,
if not all, rights to personal privacy otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment."') (quoting Jones v.
Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1992)); see also United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1219 (9th
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liberty is curtailed; it is either rescinded completely or made conditional
upon the defendant satisfying certain pretrial conditions.130 Entry into the
criminal justice system terminates the right of privacy in one's identity,
which becomes a legitimate government interest. 131
In contrast, despite accepting the constitutional permissibility of identify-
ing arrestees, 132 the Mitchell Court's dissenting judges and the District
Court at great length distinguish fingerprint and DNA collection. 133 Criti-
cally, they viewed the information gleaned from DNA as more expansive
and a breach of the presumption of innocence. 134 Thus, a permissible intru-
sion on an individual's privacy before conviction must relate to matters of
"legitimate penological interests." 135 As such, DNA analysis was viewed
differently because (1) the information potentially gleaned is more compre-
hensive than the information acquired from fingerprinting, and (2) DNA
analysis is used beyond mere identification, accrediting the actual purpose
as "solely for criminal investigative purposes."l 36
Turning to the second part of the "totality-of-the-circumstances" test, the
court determined that DNA collection from arrestees was necessary to
promote a legitimate government interest, outweighing any minimal intru-
sion on privacy. "Most compelling is the Government's strong interest in
identifying arrestees. [W]hen a suspect is arrested upon probable cause, his
identification becomes a matter of legitimate state interest."1 37 While
equating DNA collection with fingerprint collection, the court noted the
greater precision afforded by DNA analysis for identification, and how
Cir. 2010).
130 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545-46 (1979) ("[P]retrial detainees, who have not been
convicted of any crimes, retain at least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by con-
victed prisoners . . . simply because prison inmates retain certain constitutional rights does not mean
that these rights are not subject to restrictions and limitations .. This principle applies equally to pre-
trial detainees and convicted prisoners." (emphasis added)); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285
(1948).
131 See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 411. See also Jones, 962 F.2d at 306; Smith v. United States, 324
F.2d 879, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ("[lIt is elementary that a person in lawful custody may be required to
submit to photographing, and fingerprinting, as part of routine identification processes.").
132 There is a "diminished expectation of privacy" in a defendant's identity following arrest. Unit-
ed States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 608 (2009).
133 Id. ("Mitchell has a diminished expectation of privacy in his identity, but to compare the fin-
gerprinting process and the resulting identification information obtained therefrom with DNA profiling
is pure folly.").
134 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 423 (Rendell, J., dissenting) ("DNA sample contains a vast amount of
sensitive information beyond the individual's identity . . . ."). Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 609. ("The
identification issue in this instance is a red herring, as there is no compelling reason to require a DNA
sample in order to 'identify' and arrestee.").
135 Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 607.
136 Id at 610.
137 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 413 (citations omitted).
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"DNA may permit identification in cases without fingerprint or eyewitness
evidence."138 Simply, DNA aids the government in identifying suspects
with certainty, notwithstanding changes to their appearance to avoid detec-
tion. 139 Furthermore, it expressly stated how a DNA identifications' poten-
tial to implicate a suspect's other/past crimes was critical in setting appro-
priate pre-trial conditions.140 Finally, the expeditious and accurate
identification of suspects was critical to the timely investigating and prose-
cuting of present and past crimes.1 41
In contrast, by rejecting the necessity for DNA collection for identifica-
tion purposes,142 the dissenting judges and the District Court avoided genu-
ine and good faith consideration of the government's interest in DNA col-
lection.143 Instead, in particular, the District Court's holding rested
primarily on the presumption of innocence and that any interest in collect-
ing DNA samples could be realized through post-conviction DNA collec-
tion. 144
Similarly in Pool, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's finding that the collection of DNA from arrestees is consti-
tutionally acceptable.145 Pool had been indicted for possessing and receiv-
ing child pornography.146 After pleading not guilty, Pool was released sub-
138 Id at 413-14.
139 Id
140 Id. at 414; infra note 170-171.
141 Id at 414-15.
142 The District Court considered salient how a DNA sample "reveals the most intimate details of
an individual's genetic condition, implicating compelling and fundamental 'interests in human dignity
and privacy."' United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 3d 597, 606 (W.D. Pa. 2009). While acknowledg-
ing that Mitchell had a "diminished expectation of privacy in his identity," it declined to equate DNA
profiling with fingerprinting, asserting that a defendant, "maintains the highest expectation of privacy,
even though incarcerated, in his genetic code." Id. at 608. Likewise, the court rejected the Govern-
ment's assertion that DNA collection was for identification, finding that it was taken for an investiga-
tive purpose and thus pre-conviction DNA collection did not present a "compelling reason to unduly
burden a legitimate expectation of privacy . . . [to] members of society who have not been convicted,
are presumed innocent, but have been arrested and are awaiting proper trial." Id at 609-10. See United
States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 416 (Rendell, J., dissenting).
143 See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 422-23 (Rendell, J., dissenting) ("'The real purpose of collecting ...
pretrial detainees' DNA samples ... is not to 'identify 'the arrestee ... but to use those profiles and the
information they provide as evidence in the prosecution and to solve additional past and future crimes . .
."). Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 608-09.
144 See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 422 (Rendell, J., dissenting) ("The Government's interests in this case
are limited by the fact that, unlike convicts, arrestees and pretrial detainees are entitled to a presumption
of innocence"); Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 606-09.
145 The District court ruled that "after a judicial or grand jury determination ofprobable cause has
been made for felony criminal charges against a defendant, no Fourth Amendment or other Constitu-
tional violation is caused by a universal requirement that a charged defendant undergo a 'swab test' or
blood test when necessary, for the purposes of DNA analysis to be used solely for criminal law en-
forcement, identification purposes." Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d. at 906 (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit
affirmed both the result and rationale of this holding. See infra notes 146-151.
146 Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 905.
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ject to multiple pre-trial release conditions, including providing a DNA
sample, a condition subsequently challenged by Pool in the ensuing litiga-
tion. 147
On June 2, 2011, the Ninth Circuit ordered that Pool "be reheard en
banc ... [and] [t]he three-judge panel opinion not be cited as precedent." 48
The case was calendared for September 20, 2011. However, the day before,
on account of defendant Pool entering a guilty plea, the case was declared
moot and the action dismissed. 149 In its order, the court "dismiss[ed] the
appeal, vacate[d] the panel's opinion, vacate[d] the district court's and
magistrate judge's orders and remand[ed] with instruction to dismiss the
action."150
Both the district court's and three-judge panel's opinion, although not
binding precedent, will be considered persuasive on the issue of pre-
conviction DNA collection. Firstly, the three-judge panel's opinion was not
reversed, but vacated-not on the merits-but on procedural grounds. Sec-
ondly, the three-judge panel's ruling is salient on the considered issue be-
cause it is the only analysis rendered by the Ninth Circuit and is one of only
two Circuit Courts ever to have considered this inquiry. Finally, Mitchell,
the other case to directly consider this issue and which reached the same
conclusion, noted the holding and vacatur of Pool. 151
In applying the "totality-of-the-circumstances" test, the Pool court reaf-
firmed that the test requires balancing the "intrusion upon the individual's
privacy with the government's legitimate interests."1 52 However, the court
began by noting that a prerequisite for applying the "totality-of-the-
circumstances" test was that there needed to be some basis for the individ-
ual to be considered "having less than the full rights of a citizen."1 53 Agree-
ing with the Government, the court affirmed the district court's position
that a grand jury finding of probable cause was dispositive and that an in-
dicted individual is in an altered status than a common citizen. 154 Despite a
presumption of innocence, the Ninth Circuit recognized that an indicted in-
dividual is not afforded the full gamut of rights and unrestricted liberty,
147 Id. The District Court for the Eastern District of California stayed the initial DNA collection,
permitting the prosecution and defense to submit briefs on the issue, and again extended the stay pend-
ing the resolution of Pool's appeal before the Ninth Circuit. See also Pool, 621 F.3d at 1215, 1217.
148 Pool, 646 F.3d 659, 659 (9th Cir. 2011).
149 United States v. Pool, 659 F.3d 761, 761 (9th Cir. 2011).
150 Id
151 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 402, 425,426.
152 Pool, 621 F.3d at 1218.
153 Id. at 1219.
154 Id
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owing to various pretrial conditions that may be imposed.155 For example,
the court found that a defendant "may be deprived of his very liberty ... be
subject to electronic monitoring ... be ordered to obey a mandatory moni-
toring ... [and] be ordered to obey a mandatory curfew."1 56 As a result, in-
dicted individuals are not similarly situated to typical citizens of the general
public.
The court concluded that any intrusion on Pool's privacy was minimal
because the information revealed from DNA collection was for identifica-
tion and, with respect to identity, an indicted defendant has "little or no
right to hide his identity from the government."' 57 Further, in reference to
the collection procedure, the court asserted that the actual physical intru-
sion was slight. The court accepted that the purpose of DNA collection was
not designed "to reveal genetic traits such as physical and medical charac-
teristics." 158 Decisively, it echoed Kincade, emphasizing that, "[a]s current-
ly structured and implemented, . . . the DNA Act's compulsory profiling of
qualified federal offenders can only be described as minimally invasive-
both in terms of the bodily intrusion it occasions, and the information it
lawfully produces."' 5 9
Turning to the government's interests, the court acknowledged that use
of DNA was the "most accurate means of identification available," and
therefore, the government had a "legitimate" interest in "knowing the iden-
tity" of a person indicted, but released into the public population before
conviction. 160 In so holding, the Pool court expressed concern that there
existed an expansive period of time until the final disposition of a defend-
ant's case, when during such time, it was pertinent to know and confirm the
precise identity of an indicted defendant.161 In addition, the court noted
that, just like with fingerprints, "a DNA sample allows the government to
ensure that the defendant did not commit some other crime and discourages
a defendant from violating any condition of his or her pretrial release." 62
The main point of divergence from the majority holdings in Mitchell and
Pool and their dissenting counterparts was the extent to which the presump-
tion of innocence permitted the burdening of select privacy interests before
conviction, balanced against the government's interest in collecting DNA,
155 Id. at 1219-20.
156 Id.
157 Pool, 621 F.3d at 1222.
158 Id. at 1221.
159 Id. at 1222 (quoting United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 837-38 (9th Cir. 2004)).
160 Pool, 621 F.3d at 1222-23.
161 Id at 1223.
162 Id. (emphasis added).
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which was analogized to fingerprint collection in particular. Nevertheless,
the presumption of innocence does not function as an impermeable shield
against any temporary curtailment of certain rights; instead, more precisely
it parries any permanent adjustment to an individual's status, from socie-
ty's outlook, on the sole basis of the indictment.163 As acknowledged in
both Mitchell and Pool, portions of an individual's set of rights and their
liberty may be curtailed before conviction. 164 An individual's entrance into
the criminal justice system-upon a finding of probable cause that the indi-
vidual committed an illegal act-modifies that individual's rights and sta-
tus in society; they are situated differently from both convicted criminals
and other members of society.
Objection to analogizing DNA and fingerprint collection is misplaced
and misconstrues the science of DNA collection and the information that it
furnishes law enforcement.165 Insofar that DNA does have the potential to
"reveal the most intimate details of an individual's genetic condition. . ."166
it simply does not reveal to the world, by sole virtue of its collection the en-
tirety of a person's private information, with regard to conditions, predis-
positions and features. Moreover, an individual, at their own desire, cannot
change or hide their DNA and therefore it presents the prime means of
identifying individuals.167 The fact that it contains the potential to reveal
more information about an individual does not alone render it unconstitu-
tional, but it merely requires careful consideration of the constructed safe-
guards to ensure its proper application.168 Furthermore, fingerprints and
photographs are used jointly for identification and investigation purposes,
163 See Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1992) ("With the person's loss of liberty up-
on arrest comes the loss of at least some, if not all, rights to personal privacy otherwise protected by the
Fourth Amendment. Thus, persons lawfully arrested on probable cause and detained lose a right of pri-
vacy ..... ); see also Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1058 (9th Cir. 2012) ("Even critics of mandato-
ry DNA sampling concede that a felony arrestee has a diminished expectation of privacy."); infra Part
VII.ii.
164 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 411 (3d Cir. 2011) ("[P]robable cause had already
supplied the basis or bringing the person within the criminal justice system. With the person's loss of
liberty upon arrest comes the loss of at least some, if not all, rights to personal privacy otherwise pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment." (quoting Jones, 962 F.2d at 306)); Pool, 621 F.3d at 1219.
165 See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 410. Contra Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 608 ("[T]o compare the fin-
gerprinting process and the resulting identification information obtained therefrom with DNA profiling
is pure folly."); see also Haskell, 669 F.3d at 1079 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) ("Even with today's tech-
nology, however, DNA reveals more information than a fingerprint.").
166 Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 606.
167 See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 414; see also Haskell, 669 F.3d at 1063 ("Criminals can easily hide
their fingerprints by wearing gloves, but they cannot mask their DNA.").
168 See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 415 ("[T]here is no room for law enforcement officials to exercise (or
abuse) discretion by deciding whether or not to collect a DNA sample . . . [there are statutory] safe-
guards to prevent the improper use of DNA profiles and to ensure the removal of DNA records from
CODIS following a dismissal or an acquittal.").
864
2013] HARMONIZING l8 CENTURYCONS777UTI0NAL PERSPECTIVES
after being taken from an individual lawfully in custody, irrespective of
whether the crime at issue implicates the need for any form of forensics.169
Hence, a defendant has no valid basis to object to use of DNA for identifi-
cation since, because of its accuracy, it may link the said defendant to past
crimes.170 An individual has no right to privacy in past crimes and, once in
custody, it is constitutionally permissible to ensure accurate identification
of the defendant in connection with the underlying crime and any past
crimes.171
VI. THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND'S PRE-CONVICTION DNA COLLECTION SYSTEM1 72
The United Kingdom is the origin of the common law system present in
the United States. 173 Despite not being bound by the Fourth Amendment,
the United Kingdom, like the United States, struggles to balance the use of
advantageous technology in law enforcement, while maintaining individual
privacy interests. 174 Therefore, with a shared legal heritage, the United
169 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 412 ("DNA collection occurs only after it has been determined that there
is probable cause to believe that the arrestee committed a crime . . . arrestees possess a diminished ex-
pectation of privacy in their own identity, which has traditionally justified taking their fingerprints and
photographs ... [DNA profiles] ... function as 'genetic fingerprints' used only for identification pur-
poses, arrestees and pretrial detainees have reduced privacy interests in the information derived from a
DNA sample."); Jones, 962 F.2d at 306 ("[C]onsider the universal approbation of "booking" procedures
that are followed for every suspect arrested for a felony, whether or not the proof of a particular sus-
pect's crime will involve the use of fingerprint identification. Thus a tax evader is fingerprinted just the
same as is a burglar.").
170 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 414 ("Running an arrestee's DNA profile through CODIS could reveal
matches to crime-scene DNA samples from unsolved cases. Whether an arrestee is possibly implicated
in other crimes is critical to the determination of whether or not to order detention pending trial.");
United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1222 (9th Cir. 2010) ("The government's interests in DNA sam-
ples for law enforcement purposes are well established. It is the most accurate means of identification
available. Furthermore, unlike fingerprint evidence that requires that the perpetrator leave a discernable
fingerprint at the scene of a crime, it is much more difficult for a perpetrator not to leave some DNA
evidence at the scene of a crime." (emphasis added)).
171 Jones, 962 F.2d at 306 ("[W]hen a suspect is arrested upon probable cause, his identification
becomes a matter of legitimate state interest and he can hardly claim privacy in it . . . the identification
of suspects is relevant not only to solving the crime for which the suspect is arrested, but also for main-
taining a permanent record to solve other past and future crimes." (emphasis added)); Haskell, 669
F.3d at 1063 ("DNA's remarkable ability to accurately identify arrestees is a sufficiently compelling
interest to justify the 2004 Amendment . . . By accurately identifying arrestees, the DNA database also
helps solve past crimes.").
172 Throughout the entirety of the note, reference to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland (United Kingdom) refers to England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Only in
Section VII (ii), (iii) does reference to the United Kingdom exclude Scotland, which is discussed sepa-
rately.
173 Alton B. Parker, The Common Law Jurisdiction of the United States, 17 YALE L. J. 1, 2, 12
(1907); see Herbert Pope, The English Common Law in the United States, 24 HARV. L. REv. 1, 11- 12
(1910).
174 R (In re S) v. Chief Constable of S. Yorkshire, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1275, [2], [2003] 1 All
E.R. 148 (Eng.), aff'd on other grounds, [2004] UKHL 39, [2004] All E.R. 193 (appeal taken from
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Kingdom informs as to successes and problems that the United States is
likely to encounter when crafting similar legal standards.
A. European Union Conventions Bestowing Protections Similar to the
Fourth Amendment and are Presumptively Binding on European Union
Members.
The United Kingdom is subject to numerous European Union provisions
that are analogous to the spirit and effect that the Fourth Amendment
should have on DNA collections in the United States. First, the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 8
memorializes a general right to privacy that may only be disturbed, as
"necessary in a democratic society in the interests of... public safety
or ... for the prevention of disorder or crime . . . ."175 Secondly, the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 48 guarantees
the presumption of innocence until proven guilty.176 These protections are
similar to those offered by the Fourth Amendment, and hence provide a
framework by which the judicial treatment of DNA collection may be con-
sidered as persuasive guide for the United States.
B. Statutory Scheme for DNA Collection in the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland
The statutory scheme providing for the collection of biological samples
in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland ("United Kingdom") is separate
from Scotland. Recently, the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR")
condemned the DNA collection system in the United Kingdom, although
praised the model adopted in Scotland.177 The differences and similarities
between the two systems, the yielded results, and the ensuing treatment by
the ECHR, offers a guide to the United States on how to avoid the existing
hazards prevalent in the United Kingdom's system, yet maintain the suc-
cessful components of both the United Kingdom's and Scotland's system.
The United Kingdom's statute is promulgated in the Police and Criminal
Eng.) ("[C]ourts are now required to perform [the role] .. . of holding the balance between the rights of
the individual and the rights of the state."). See Craig Nydick, Comment, The British Invasion (of Pri-
vacy): DNA Databases in the United Kingdom and United States in the Wake of the Marper Case, 23
EMORY INT'L L. REv. 609, 613 (2009) (suggesting that the United States and the United Kingdom fol-
low the guidelines set out by the European Court to help balance law enforcement interests and privacy
interests).
175 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4,
1950, C.E.T.S. No. 5.
176 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 48, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 389, 401.
177 See infra note 194.
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Evidence Act of 1984 ("PCEA"), Chapter 60, Part V, Sections 61-64.178
Scotland's statute is promulgated in the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act
of 1995, Chapter 46, Part II, Sections 18-20.179
Both the United Kingdom's and Scotland's statutes permit DNA collec-
tion before conviction. Indeed, in the United Kingdom, the dominant meth-
od of DNA collection before conviction is when an individual is "in police
detention in consequence of his arrest for a recordable offense;"1s0 or
"charged with a recordable offense . . . ."181 Similarly, in Scotland, the col-
lection of samples may occur when "a person has been arrested and is in
custody or is detained,"1 82 during which time, law enforcement may "re-
quire the person to provide . . . such relevant physical data." 83 Thus, in
both the United Kingdom and Scotland, DNA samples are collected when a
suspect is arrested or otherwise taken into custody, thereby well in advance
of conviction.
Both the United Kingdom and Scotland distinguish between "intimate"
and "non-intimate" samples and searches. In the United Kingdom, an "in-
timate sample" includes all internal bodily fluids184 and "a swab taken
from ... a person's body orifice other than the mouth."185 In contrast, a
"non-intimate sample" includes all non-pubic hairs, saliva, and "a swab
taken from any part of a person's body other than a part from which ...
would be an intimate sample." 186 Hence samples derived from buccal
swabs are non-intimate samples.187 In Scotland, the "intimate" and "non-
intimate" distinction is similar, primarily collecting DNA via, non-pubic
hairs, finger/toenails, or "[a biol6gical sample] from the inside of the per-
son's mouth, by means of swabbing, a sample of saliva or other materi-
al."188
DNA retention is the main distinction between the United Kingdom's
178 Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, §§ 61-64.
179 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995, c. 46, §§ 18-20.
180 Police and Criminal Evidence Act, c. 60, § 63(2B).
181 Id. § 63(3A).
182 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, c. 46, § 18(1).
183 Id. § 18(2).
184 See Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60 § 65 ('"[I]ntimate sample' means ... a sam-
ple of blood, semen or any other tissue fluid, urine or pubic hair.").
185 Id. (emphasis added).
186 Id An amendment by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act of 2005, chapter 15, section
119(3) classified swabs taken from the mouth (buccal swabs) as not intimate samples.
187 Most of the DNA samples that form the United Kingdom's DNA database are usually collected
by means of a buccal swab (swabbing the inside of the check for epithelial cells). Europe Court Nixes
U.K. DNA Databases, CBS NEWS, Feb. 11, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/12/04/world/main4648536.shtml?tag=mncol; lst;l.
188 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, c. 46 § 18(6), (6A).
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and Scotland's DNA collection systems. The United Kingdom permits vir-
tually indefinite retention when DNA is collected "in connection with in-
vestigation of an offense,"l 89 provided the samples are used for law en-
forcement purposes.190 In contrast, Scotland operates a dual retention
system for DNA collected from individuals who are not ultimately convict-
ed of the underlying offense. Where the underlying charges involve certain
violent or sexual offenses, yet conclude without a conviction, the sam-
ple/profile may be retained for three years. 191 All other offenses require
that upon dismissal or acquittal, all samples/profiles be destroyed.192 Sig-
nificantly, both systems necessitate DNA collection prior to conviction and
thus these retention provisions have proved central in the ongoing debate in
Europe about the use of DNA in the criminal justice system.
C. The Judicial Treatment Of The United Kingdom's DNA Collection
System
Much of the controversy in the United Kingdom and Europe regarding
DNA collection concerns how long a profile/sample may be retained and
whether and when it must be destroyed if the defendant is not ultimately
convicted of the underlying offense. 193 There has been little focused litiga-
tion on DNA collection from arrestees, but a recent ruling by the ECHR,194
set precedent sub silentio, 195 sanctioning the collection of DNA from ar-
restees, by praising Scotland's DNA system, though casting doubt on por-
tions of the United Kingdom's DNA system.
In S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom, in ruling on a case appealed
from the House of Lords, 196 the ECHR held that the indefinite retention of
189 Police and Criminal Evidence Act, c. 60, § 64(lA).
190 See id.
191 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, c. 46, § 18A(2), (4)(a).
192 Id. § 18 (1995).
193 Kate Beattie, S and Marper v. UK: privacy, DNA, and crime prevention, 2 EuR. HUM. L. REV.
229, 229-30 (2009); Jason M. Swergold, To Have and to Hold: The Future of DNA Retention in the
United Kingdom, 33 B.C. INT'L & COMP L.REV. 179, 200 (2010).
194 S. & Marper v. the United Kingdom, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. 50 (2008).
195 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1469 (Brian A. Garner, ed., 8th ed. 1999) ("Under silence;
without notice being taken; without being expressly mentioned.").
196 Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, [2004] UKHL 39, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1275 (appeal taken
from Eng.). Two applicants, S and Mr. Marper, were arrested for separate, non-violent offenses. Upon
arrest, their fingerprints and a DNA sample were taken. The former applicant was acquitted; charges
were dropped against the latter applicant. As a result, both requested that their fingerprints and DNA
samples be destroyed. The Crown Prosecution Services refused, and triggered the resulting litigation.
Id.; see DNA and Human Rights: Throw it Out, ECONOMIST, 2008 WLNR 23421838, December 6th,
2008 [Hereinafter ECONOMIST: DNA].
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DNA profiles violated a right to privacy. 197 "The core complaint to the Eu-
ropean [C]ourt [of Human Rights] centered on retaining DNA, not collect-
ing it to solve crimes."198 The ECHR emphasized that retaining DNA sam-
ples/profiles indefinitely after judicial proceedings have ceased,
particularly if an individual was acquitted or the charges dropped, was in-
consistent with European Union conventions. 199 In particular, the United
Kingdom was condemned for its retention policy, 200 yet the ECHR favora-
bly noted the collection/retention policies of other European countries, and
praised the Scottish model as a "fair and proportionate system."201 Set forth
under the provision titled "The Court's Assessment," the ECHR asserted
that the "position of Scotland, as a part of the United Kingdom itself, is of
particular significance in this regard." 202 That is in Scotland, the "biologi-
cal samples and profiles may be retained for three years, if the arrestee is
suspected of certain sexual or violent offenses even if a person is not con-
victed."203 Though the ECHR merely acknowledged a segment of Scot-
land's retention system, the entirety of Scotland's DNA collection system
is contingent on collection well before conviction.204
The variance between the United Kingdom and the European Un-
ion/Scotland was not the actual collection of DNA, but rather the blanket
retention of such samples irrespective of whether the person was actually
convicted. 205 Issues of retention may take two forms: (1) the retention of a
sample/profile after the judicial role has ceased, but the defendant not be
convicted of the underlying offense; or (2) the retention of a sample/profile
after conviction. The decision in S. and Marper addressed the former. Ac-
cordingly, concerns over indefinite retention of DNA only emerge where
DNA is taken before the defendant is convicted of the underlying offense.
197 S. & Marper, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 77; European Court Nixes UK DNA Database, CBS NEWS,
(February 11, 2009 1:55PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2102-202_162-4648536.html; see ECONOMIST:
DNA, supra note 196.
198 CBS NEWS, supra note 197 (emphasis added); see S.& Marper, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 106.
199 S. & Marper, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 125.
200 "[T]he Court is struck by the blanket and indiscriminate nature of the power of retention in
England and Wales. The material may be retained irrespective of the nature or gravity of the offence
with which the individual was originally suspected ... samples may be taken-and retained-from a
person of any age, arrested in connection with a recordable offence, which includes minor or non-
imprisonable offences." Id at 119 (emphasis added).
201 Time Limits on Innocent DNA Data, BBC NEWS (May 7, 2009 11:24 AM),
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hiluk news/8037042.htm.
202 S. & Marper, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 109.
203 Id. at 36.
204 Supra Part VII.ii.
205 S. & Marper, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 110 ("England, Wales and Northern Ireland appear to be the
only jurisdictions within the Council of Europe to allow the indefinite retention of fingerprints and
DNA material... suspected of any recordable offense." (emphasis added)).
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By limiting its consideration to the retention of DNA in the absence of
conviction, the ECHR implicitly sanctioned pre-conviction DNA collec-
tion, though circumscribed the scope of retention if the defendant is not
convicted.
In finding the pre-conviction collection of DNA appropriate, the ECHR
noted that a "majority of the Council of Europe member States allow the
compulsory taking of fingerprints and cellular samples in the context of
criminal proceeding. , . ."206 Later it acknowledged that the "strong con-
sensus existing among the contracting states in this respect is of considera-
ble importance . .. in the assessment of the permissible limits of the inter-
ference with private life . . . ."207 The "balancing [of] the potential benefits
of the extensive use of. . . [modern scientific techniques in the criminal-
justice system] against important private-life interests," 208 specifically re-
tention policies, offered the basis under which to view the DNA polices of
European countries-including Scotland's-favorably.
VII. PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS FOR PRE-CONVICTIONS DNA
COLLECTION IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
In the two centuries since the drafting of the Fourth Amendment, to ac-
count for advancing technologies, courts have developed extensive juris-
prudence that construes the Amendment more flexibly than its strict text
provides.209 The expanding use of DNA in the criminal justice system is
among the most recent challenges to the Fourth Amendment. The use of
DNA offers law enforcement the opportunity to: (1) establish identification
records of convicted individuals, which may be used to assist in solving
past and future crimes by putting law enforcement at large on notice; (2)
deter future criminal conduct of released individuals; (3) assist in exculpat-
ing individuals who were wrongfully convicted.210 In furtherance of these
objectives, "[i]t is of paramount importance that law enforcement agen-
cies ... take full advantage of available techniques of modem technology
and forensic science." 211 To do so, it is imperative that the Fourth Amend-
ment not tether modem society to the 18th century such that the application
206 Id. at 45 (emphasis added); see id. at 108.
207 Id. at 112.
208 Id
209 See supra Parts III-V.
210 See United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 678 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Pool, 645 F.
Supp. 2d 903, 910 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
211 Regina v. Chief Constable ofSouth Yorkshire, [2004] UKHL 39.
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of modem scientific advances is frustrated. 212 It is equally important to not
reduce the protections offered by the Fourth Amendment to a nullity by in-
terpreting it too narrowly. Recently, circuit courts have struggled to select
and apply existing Fourth Amendment tests to the collection of DNA.213
The forgoing formulation presents a hybrid analysis by which to consider
pre-conviction DNA collection by integrating both the "totality-of-
circumstances" test and "special needs" doctrine.
Pre-conviction DNA collection should be evaluated under a quasi-
totality of circumstances approach by balancing the government's interest
against an individual's privacy interest. 214 However, the reasonableness of
the search, should be weighed in favor of the government and therefore
against the individual's privacy interest provided that the following attrib-
utes of DNA collection are all preserved: (1) DNA may be collected only
post-indictment for a felony, not post-arrest or for a non-felony; (2) collec-
tion be per the least intrusive means possible; (3) the scope of DNA ana-
lyzed be limited to what is sufficient for identification and only then in
connection with law enforcement; (4) that in the event of dismissal or ac-
quittal, the entirety of the DNA profile be automatically expunged. A de-
fendant may overcome this presumption in favor of the government, if he is
able to show: (1) failure by the government to uniformly adhere to these
requirements; or (2) sustained abuses of DNA collection by the govern-
ment; or (3) given further scientific advances, there is a less intrusive
means to accomplish all the present objectives satisfied by present DNA
collection.
A. Attribute #1 - DNA may only be Collected after a Defendant has been
Indicted for a Felony
The appropriate balance is not collection post-arrest, but rather collection
post-indictment.215 Following indictment, the presumption of innocence is
212 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472-73 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("[G]eneral limitations on the powers of government ... do not forbid the United States or the states
from meeting modem conditions .. . Clauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific
abuses of power, must have a similar capacity of adaptation to a changing world ... Time works chang-
es, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principal to be vital must be capable
of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth."); Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,
387 (1926).
213 See supra note 93.
214 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001) ("Although the Fourth Amendment ordinar-
ily requires the degree of probability embodied in the term "probable cause," a lesser degree satisfies
the Constitution when the balance of governmental and private interests makes such a standard reason-
able."); United States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975).
215 The District Court for the Eastern District of California, in Pool, struck the appropriate balance
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but a truism that merely reflects the declaration that, until proven guilty be-
yond a reasonable doubt, an individual is not yet equated with having
committed the act charged in the indictment. 216 An indictment does not
present an absolute bar to the restriction of a defendant's liberty and priva-
cy interests.217 The collection of DNA does not deny the presumption of
innocence; more precisely, it is an early challenge to that presumption.
Critically, when DNA is collected pursuant to an indictment 218 that collec-
tion is not an "unreasonable search and seizure," 219 nor is it the speculative
searching for criminality,220 but rather it is collected when there is probable
cause to believe that the individual committed the charged act. 22 1 There-
fore, DNA collected in conjunction with an indictment is reasonable, which
is an essential component to passing constitutional muster.
As there is a preexisting distinction between felonies and misdemeanors,
so too should that distinction exist with respect to DNA collection. 222 This
asserting that "after a judicial or grand jury determination of probable cause has been made for felony
criminal charges ... no Fourth Amendment violation is caused by a universal requirement that a charged
defendant, in a felony case undergo a 'swab test,'. . . for the purposes of DNA analysis to be used solelyfrom criminal law enforcement, identification purposes." Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 913 (emphasis add-
ed).
216 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979) ("The presumption of innocence is a doctrine
that allocates the burden of proof in criminal trials; it also may serve as an admonishment to the jury to
judge an accused's guilt or innocence solely on the evidence adduced at trial and not on the basis of
suspicions that may arise from the fact of his arrest, indictment, or custody, or from other matters not
introduced as proof at trial . . . ." (internal citations omitted)). The Supreme Court in Wolfish "exam-
ine[d] the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees-those persons who have been charged with a crime
but who have not yet been tried on the charge." Id at 523.
217 See id. at 533 ("The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is
the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the admin-
istration of our criminal law. But it has no application to a determination of the rights of a pretrial de-
tainee during confinement before his trial has even begun." (emphasis added)); see also supra Part VI,
para. 7-8.
218 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 7.
219 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
220 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (holding that warrantless drug tests of
pregnant women at a hospital, which turned over evidence of purported drug use in advance consensus
with law enforcement, was a violation of the Fourth Amendment and did not satisfy the special needs
exception); see Pool, 645 F.Supp.2d at 909.
221 United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 US. 418, 423 (1983) ("The grand jury ... serves
the 'dual function of determining if there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed
and of protecting citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions." (emphasis added) (quoting
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-87 (1972)); see Bracy v. United States, 435 U.S. 1301, 1302
(1978) ("The grand jury ... only sits to determine whether there is probable cause to believe them [the
charges], so as to require him [the defendant] to stand his [or her] trial."); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S.
375, 390 (1962) ("[T]his body [the grand jury] has been regarded as a primary security to the innocent
against hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable function in our society of
standing between the accuser and the accused . .. to determine whether a charge is founded upon reason
or was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal ill will."); United States v.
Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 622 (2d. Cir. 1962) ("The grand jury has the equally important duty of pro-
tecting persons against unfounded or unsupported charges and, absent a finding probable cause, it may
not file and indictment").
222 As used herein, a felony in the federal criminal justice system refers to offenses requiring min-
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is because the ramifications of a felony indictment and the seriousness of
the alleged crime are significantly greater than for a misdemeanor. While
felonies reflect a wide range of offenses, they typify offenses viewed
grievously by society; in contrast, non-felonies usually implicate less seri-
ous or trivial offenses. Pretrial restrictions reveal the distinction between
felonies and misdemeanors and bespeak differing privacy interests. For ex-
ample, serious felonies may require that the defendant be remanded until
trial, be restricted to the jurisdiction, wear a GPS tracker, or observe a cur-
few. In contrast, for significantly less serious crimes, particularly misde-
meanors, an individual may be released on his own recognizance or be re-
quired to post a nominal bond until trial.223
Restricting DNA collection to individuals indicted for a felony better
balances the reasonableness of the intrusion on privacy interests because of
the seriousness and implications of the underlying charges. Presently, the
United States code contains separate statutory sections regarding pre-
conviction DNA collection. 224 As a result of these differing sections,
whether the current statutory scheme permits DNA collection post-arrest
for a non-felony crime is unclear. This is not unlike the overly broad col-
lection scheme in the United Kingdom, which before the ECHR's decision,
permitted collection upon arrest or charge.225
The United Kingdom's DNA system hastily collected DNA with faint
connection to the seriousness of the offense or the likelihood of a genuine
prosecution. Consequently, a considerable portion of the British population
had their DNA recorded and a great proportion of such individuals were
not actually convicted of the triggering offense.226 The ECHR noted that
among the faults present and exclusive to the United Kingdom's DNA sys-
tem was that there was no floor on the severity of the crime required for
DNA collection. This is especially problematic given that there exists an
inverse relationship between the severity of the crimes committed and the
amount of people committing such crimes. In the United Kingdom, "beg-
ging or being drunk and disorderly" illustrated the type of minor offenses
for which an individual's DNA may be collected, but would unlikely result
imum of one-year one-days imprisonment.
223 Pool, 645 F.Supp.2d at 909.
224 Supra Part VI.
225 Supra note 196 and accompanying text.
226 The United Kingdom's DNA database contained approximately "5.3 m[illion] profiles, repre-
senting 9% of the population," in which 200,000 profiles were from individuals who were never con-
victed. ECONOMIST: DNA, supra note 171; Paisley Dodds, European Court Strikes Down British Law
on DNA, DESERET NEWS (Dec. 5, 2008, 12:41 AM),
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/705268193/European-court-strikes-down-British-law-on-
DNA.html?pg=all.
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in genuine prosecution. 227 Restricting the proportion of individuals whose
DNA is collected directly minimizes the intrusion on an individual's priva-
cy.
The United States should heed the British experience to avoid undesired
results that may construe the DNA regime as unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. The United States should amend its statutory scheme
to condition pre-conviction DNA collection on a felony indictment. Any-
thing short of this, such as arrest or detainment, would be insufficient. This
better correlates with the government's goal of resolving to prosecute of-
fenses so to obtain jury verdicts or pleas. Setting a felony indictment as the
minimum requirement for pre-conviction DNA collection would limit col-
lection to those serious offenders that the Government intends to meaning-
fully prosecute.
B. Attribute #2 -DNA should be Collected from Individuals Employing
the Least Intrusive Procedures Possible
The federal statutes 42 U.S.C. § 14131-14136e and its corresponding
DOJ regulation §28.12, do not provide for specific methods of collec-
tion.228 The United Kingdom distinguishes between intimate and non-
intimate samples/collections, 229 and an analogous statutory scheme should
similarly be adopted. Such a statutory revision places the public on notice
of the procedures used, attempts to minimize intrusions on privacy, and
serves as an approximate adoption of the progeny of cases balancing the
Fourth Amendment and the taking of biological samples. 230 While DNA
collection, like that of other biological samples, is a search, 231 when taken
in the least restrictive manner possible, it is a reasonable search passing
constitutional muster.232
227 See ECONOMIST: DNA, supra note 196; Paisley Dodds, European Court Strikes Down British
Law on DNA, DESERET NEWS (Dec. 5, 2008, 12:41 AM),
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/705268193/European-court-strikes-down-British-law-on-
DNA.html?pg-all.
228 The DOJ regulation codified at 28 C.F.R. §28.12 (2012) minimally and vaguely describes the
method of collection; inadequate to ensure that the collection is conducted in the least intrusive means
possible. See supra Part V.
229 See supra Part VII(ii).
230 See supra part IV.
231 See supra note 83; Schlicher v. Peters, 103 F.3d 940, 942-43 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he collec-
tion, analysis and storage of blood and saliva . . . is a search and seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.").
232 See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985) ("In noting that a blood test was 'commonplace
in these days of periodic physical examinations,' Schmerber recognized society's judgment that blood
tests do not constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an individual's personal privacy and bodily
integrity"). Such equivalence would suggest that buccal swabs, the swabbing of the inside of ones cheek
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Beginning with the Katz formulation, the primary question is whether
society would recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in the collec-
tion of DNA before conviction. Emerging Fourth Amendment doctrine fo-
cused on the "individual's interest in privacy and security" balanced
"against society's interest in conducting the procedure." 233 Previous cases
focused on the extent to which the sought biological sample was displayed
to the public because it directly correlated with the degree of bodily inva-
sion caused by collection, which could place the individual's health and
safety at risk, or severely compromise "interests in personal privacy and
bodily integrity." 234 However, the actual collection of DNA is different
from the collection of blood, fingerprints, tissue, or voice exemplars. Since
DNA is omnipresent in nearly every cell of the human body, collection
could easily be accomplished without placing the life and heath of individ-
ual at risk by an invasive procedure that impairs the integrity of the indi-
vidual's body.235
Both the United Kingdom and Scotland list multiple non-intimate collec-
tion methods, although their chief procedure for DNA collection is a buccal
swab. 236 To obtain such a DNA sample, law enforcement rubs a sterile
swab inside a person's mouth for a couple of seconds to collect epithelial
cells. Since, the mouth is a natural bodily cavity, accustomed as a natural
pathway, such DNA collection does not raise concerns about risks to the
individual's health, life, and dignity, nor is it unduly invasive. DNA collec-
for a few seconds, are just as commonplace as blood tests and therefore do not amount to a great and
overbearing intrusion on an individuals privacy.
233 Id. at 760; see supra Part IV.
234 Id.
235 While there has been considerable dispute about equating fingerprinting and DNA collection, it
is submitted that they are analogous. Identification through DNA profiling is similar to fingerprinting,
different only in that it reflects the latest scientific advances, which offer more complete coordination
among law enforcement. Furthermore, though an individual cannot tamper with his or her DNA, a so-
phisticated criminal may tamper with his fingerprints. In addition, DNA profiling is not physically more
significant than fingerprinting and not more embarrassing than being indicated for a felony. As stated in
United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 68-70 (2d. Cir. 1932), "the person arrested and thus humiliated may
be entirely innocent . . . [Fingerprinting] is no more humiliating than other means of identification that
have been universally held to infringe neither constitutional nor common-law rights. As a physical inva-
sion it amounts to almost nothing, and as a humiliation it can never amount to as much as that caused by
the publicity attending a sensational indictment to which innocent men may have to submit." Ultimate-
ly, much of the objection to DNA supplementing existing identification methods rests on resistance to
new technology and the uncertainty of its implications on a changing and evolving society. This is ech-
oed in United States v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903, 912 (E.D. Cal. 2009), where the court stated, "[o]ur
modem technological society cannot function in an atmosphere of privacy paralysis occasioned by a
parade of 'what ifs.' The court observes that the arguments, fears and concerns regarding DNA collec-
tion are nearly identical to those expressed about fingerprinting more than seventy years ago."
236 Roberto Puch-Solis et. al., Assessing the Probative Value of DNA Evidence: Guidance for
Judges, Lawyers, Forensic Scientists and Expert Witnesses, 2, 106, Feb. 2012, available at
http://www.maths.ed.ac.uk/-cgga/Guide-2-WEB.pdf; Europe Court Nixes U.K. DNA Database, CBS
News, Dec. 4, 2008, http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-4648536.html.
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tion through buccal swabs greatly mitigates and minimizes intrusions on an
individual's privacy interest,237 while permitting such collection to advance
society's interest in collecting DNA from indicted individuals before con-
viction. When the privacy interest is reduced in this manner, so too is the
reasonable expectation of privacy.
C Attribute #3 - The Scope ofDNA Analyzed is Limited to what is
Sufficient for Identifying the Defendant and is Restricted to Law
Enforcement
DNA analysis should be circumscribed to explore and profile only the
extent necessary to accurately confirm an individual's identity. Limiting
the analysis to what is sufficient for identification avoids revealing exten-
sive portions of an individual's genome and therefore minimizes the intru-
sion on privacy by revealing identifying features or predispositions. Pres-
ently, and appropriately, DNA analysis utilizes two elements to eschew
revelation of private information: (1) unitizing "junk DNA," which are
DNA segments that do not correspond to DNA sequences related to ex-
pressing identifying characteristics or features; and (2) using thirteen stand-
ard loci as a uniform standard, thus restricting the analysis to only thirteen
segments on different chromosomes that exist among 20,000 to 25,000
genes. 238
A chief concern regarding DNA analysis is its potential to reveal an ex-
tensive and limitless amount of sensitive private information about an indi-
vidual; however, use of "junk DNA" mitigates this concern. "Junk DNA"
does not correspond to DNA regions responsible for specific biological
functions or characteristics, and thereby its analysis is highly unlikely to
reveal sensitive details. Moreover, the selected "junk DNA" used in DNA
profiling, to wit, the thirteen loci, contains sufficient polymorphisms to
permit identification, although the "junk DNA" itself is not necessarily ex-
clusive to a particular person, only the polymorphisms. In fact, "identical
'junk DNA' appears in as genetically diverse species as humans, mice,
237 To the extent that Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 2009) held that a "buccal
swab constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment," this is distinguishable from what is advanced
herein. The circumstances of collection in Friedman are different; DNA was forcibly collected under
authority of a state statute, without a court order, without probable cause, absent an indictment, and for
reasons outside identification purposes. Id. at 854, 859; Pool, 621 F.3d at 1224-25. Moreover, Fried-
man is inapposite to the present analysis because its conclusion was reached by applying a pure "special
needs" analysis, which is divergent from the hybrid analysis undertaken herein and the "totality-of-
circumstances" approach undertaken in Kincade. Id.
238 Fitzpatrick & Yeiser, supra note 14, at 8; U.S. Library of Medicine: Genetics, supra note 11.
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dogs, and fish,"239 and thus the DNA selected for use in profiling is not re-
flective of private individual details, but are DNA segments found across
humans and animals.240
Analyzing the thirteen loci, when isolated from among the 20,000 to
25,000 genes, does not necessarily convey revealing characteristics appli-
cable to the person as a whole when considering all their genes. Simply, a
part-whole fallacy is presented. When the constituant parts of a whole are
disunited, in isolation, those parts do not express the characteristics of the
undivided whole. Instead each part only expresses characteristics of itself.
Only when reunited with all the parts can it again express the characteris-
tics of the undivided whole.
The forgoing illustrates this proposition. A computer, denominated "Al-
pha," contains a prodigious amount of saved private information on its hard
drive and all of the saved information is unique to that particular computer.
When the computer is functional, the information is easily explored, as all
the data is "aggregated and whole." However, if all the information con-
tained on the computer is converted to binary form, 24 1 the saved infor-
mation may still technically be explored, albeit with great difficulty. To
wit, the totality of all the information expressed in binary form would total
millions of pages. If thirteen pages are extracted from this totality of con-
verted information, those thirteen pages would be unique to that computer,
but by themselves would not reveal any private information in compre-
hendible form. Simply, the totality of the saved information would yield a
unique binary sequence, in which the thirteen pages would be sufficient to
239 Fitzpatrick & Yeiser, supra note 14, at 3.
240 These limitations notwithstanding, critics of DNA profiling continue to raise concerns that fu-
ture discoveries and understandings for "junk DNA" can one day impact privacy interests. However,
this would nonetheless have a de minimus impact on privacy interests if in the future it was discovered
that the thirteen standard loci are not really "junk DNA" and do serve some genetic purpose. Should
such a discovery occur, in accordance with Katz, individuals would no longer have a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in those specific thirteen loci. This is because the thirteen existing loci: (1) were cho-
sen well before their purported use and value was known; (2) consist of a small fraction of the total ex-
isting unique markers that an individual possesses, hence the extent of person's genetic code that is
revealed is restrained; and (3) are standard for all individuals, thereby treating everyone equally and
reducing the privacy interests associated with the information revealed by those specific thirteen loci.
Moreover, an individual generally possess a diminished privacy interest with respect to physical fea-
tures displayed or discernable to the public, for instance, sex, race, eye color, and hair color. These fea-
tures-and even those hidden from the public-do not in isolation identify a specific individual, but
only when aggregated are able to identify and distinguish one individual from another. Thus, even if
future discoveries reveal that one of the thirteen loci is associated with a single identifying characteris-
tic, the exposure of that characteristic would not compromise an individual's privacy. In fact, an indi-
vidual does not hold a strong or sufficient privacy interest in a single characteristic viewed in isolation.
241 See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/binary+code (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) ("[A] coding
system using the binary digits 0 and I to represent a letter, digit, or other character in a computer or
other electronic device.").
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identify "computer Alpha," as opposed to any other computer, but would
be insufficient to reveal the computer's hard drive without analyzing the
millions of converted binary pages together.
Similarly, a person's genome is the totality of their genetic structure and
is therefore metaphorical to computer data expressed in binary form. 242 On-
ly thirteen loci are examined out of a total potential of 20,000 to 25,000
genes that comprise the twenty-three pairs of human chromosomes. The
rendered analysis produces a profile that is sufficient, like the thirteen bina-
ry pages of computer Alpha, to identify an individual, but is insufficient to
express all of the information contained in a person's genetic structure. A
person's genome displayed as the sequence of alternating nucleotide
chains, is analogous to the binary expression of computer Alpha's hard
drive. Both technically permit the evaluation, albeit with incredible diffi-
culty, of all of the contained information. Though the thirteen pages, (and
by extension, the thirteen loci), may be used for identification, they are un-
able, without all the constituent pieces, to convey all of the stored infor-
mation. When viewed separately from their constituent pieces, the thirteen
pages and loci express themselves differently than when united with all the
pieces of the undivided whole.
Fundamentally, that a DNA profile is expressed as a set of differing
mathematical probabilities, as opposed to a summary of one's complete
medical history, mitigates potential privacy concerns. DNA analysis is the
computation of the probability of "the likelihood that a given profile came
from a particular individual and the likelihood that it came from a random
unrelated person."243 Simply, an identification derived from DNA analysis
is a probability ratio.244 For instance, a "positive match" identifying and
linking an individual to a sample left at a crime scene, is expressed by an
infinitesimally small probability ratio, that is, the extremely small probabil-
ity that the match of thirteen loci between the sample recovered at a crime
scene and the sample of the defendant could have originated from altema-
242 This analogy is far from tenuous. Binary is a unique pattern of two variables (zero-one), where-
as DNA is a unique pattern of multiple variables (nucleotides). Binary code reflects a unique pattern of
zeros and ones, whereas DNA instructions reflect a unique pattern and sequence for alternating nucleo-
tide chains. To wit, nucleotides are comprised of a nitrogen base, sugar and phosphate. The four nitro-
gen bases couple to form base pairs: bases Adenine and Thymine and bases Cytosine and Guanine,
which bond to alternating sugar and phosphate molecules. See supra note 13.
243 DNA Initiative (Apr. 1, 2013), available at http://www.dna.gov/glossary.
244 APRI, supra note 13, at 14 ("[The] statistical formulae allow the analyst to demonstrate, using
13 loci . .. that an individual profile matching the profile generated from the crime evidence will not be
found in any other unrelated person on earth."); see generally Mark W. Perlin, EXPLAINING THE
LIKELIHOOD RATIO IN DNA MIXTURE INTERPRETATION (Dec. 29, 2010), available at
http://www.promega.com/-/media/files/resources/conference%20proceedings/ishi%2021/oral%20prese
ntations/perlin.pdf7la-en.
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tive sources. 245 This can also be expressed by the relatively large probabil-
ity that the two samples are derived from the same source.
While DNA collection provides many advantages in the effort to curb
crime, access and use of DNA profiles should be tightly restricted to law
enforcement purposes. When utilized narrowly, so as to coordinate the ef-
forts of law enforcement in fully identifying individuals apprehended and
already indicted with a crime, it is a reasonable burden on the privacy in-
terests of the indicted individual. 246 An indicted defendant does not have a
right of privacy to past committed crireinal acts. 247 Identification is realized
through the collection of DNA post-indictment by throwing open the door
to any past criminal acts of a person who is already in custody and where a
finding of probable cause determined that they committed the acts alleged
in the indictment. 248
Collecting DNA in this manner is not the siphoning of individuals off the
street in the aimless search of hoping to detect possible criminal activity.249
Rather, DNA identification serves the purpose of alerting law enforcement
at large to which individuals have recently been indicted, so as to obtain
particularized information that may aid in evaluating whether such individ-
uals poses a danger to the public pending trial. During a time when indi-
viduals may easily travel across the country and world, as well as radically
modify their appearance, the use of DNA identification is necessary to ac-
curately identify persons in custody, who have been indicted for a crime.250
It therefore provides the means for ascertaining whether the individual is
245 McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 130 (2010) ("[T]he probability another person from the
general population would share the same DNA (the 'random match probability') was only I in
3,000,000."); APRI, supra note 13, at 14 ("The total random match probability is the probability of that
exact genetic profile being found in someone, other than the suspect, within the human population.").
246 Kelly, 55 F.2d at 68 ("Any restraint of the person may be burdensome. But some burdens must
be home for the good of the community. The slight interference with the person involved in finger
printing seems to us one which must be bome in the common interest.").
247 Supra note 171 and accompanying text.
248 Supra note 164, 170-71 and accompanying text.
249 See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
250 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 414 ("[T]he perpetrator will take unusual steps to conceal not only his
conduct, but also his identity. Disguises used while committing a crime may be supplemented or re-
placed by changed names, and even changed physical features. Traditional methods of identification by
photographs, historical records, and fingerprints often prove inadequate .... Even a suspect with al-
tered physical features cannot escape the match that his DNA might make with a sample contained in a
DNA bank, or left at the scene of a crime within samples of blood, skin, semen or hair follicles." (quot-
ing United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 185 (3d Cir. 2005)); Kelly, 55 F.2d at 69 ("Finger print-
ing seems to be no more than an extension of methods of identification long used in dealing with per-
sons under arrest for real or supposed violations of the criminal laws. It is known to be a very certain
means devised by modem science to reach the desired end, and has become especially important in a
time when increased population and vast aggregations of people in urban centers have rendered the
notoriety of the individual in the community no longer a ready means of identification." (emphasis add-
ed)).
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under alias, using a stolen identity, has violent tendencies, or is a threat to
witnesses and alleged victims. 251
Finally, access to DNA databases should be narrowly drawn, coupled
with strict and clear penalties enforced against those who illegally or im-
properly acquire DNA profiles for an impermissible purpose. The protec-
tions currently outlined at 42 U.S.C. § 14133(b-c), which restrict to whom
DNA profiles may be disclosed, and provide for harsh penalties for know-
ingly disclosing or wrongfully acquiring DNA profiles, are sufficient for
any DNA collection system.252
D. Attribute #4 - Automatic Destruction of the DNA Profile should occur
in the Event ofDismissal or Acquittal
A pre-conviction DNA profile should promptly and automatically be ex-
punged if judicial proceedings terminate without a conviction. 253 The chief
concerns relating to DNA collection and profiles are more closely correlat-
ed with issues of retention, rather than collection. To avoid the United
Kingdom's problematic retention system, a pre-conviction collection-
retention policy 254 must reasonably balance individual privacy concerns
and guarantee that the status of individuals whose criminal proceedings end
without conviction are treated equally to the status of individuals in the
general public.
Presently, 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d) requires that individuals provide a certi-
fied "copy of a court order"255 reflecting dismissal or acquittal in order to
have their profile removed. This is similar to the United Kingdom's prob-
251 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004)
("Knowledge of identity may inform an officer that a suspect is wanted for another offense, or has a
record of violence or mental disorder."); Jones, 962 F.2d at 307 ("[P~erpetrator [of criminal conduct]
will take unusual steps to conceal not only his conduct, but also his identity. Disguises used while
committing a crime may be supplemented or replaced by changed names, and even changed physical
features. Traditional methods of identification by photographs, historical records, and fingerprints often
prove inadequate ... The individuality of the DNA provides a dramatic new tool for the law enforce-
ment effort to match suspects and criminal conduct. Even a suspect with altered physical features can-
not escape the match that his DNA might make . . . [the] governmental justification for this form of
identification, therefore, relies on no argument different in kind from that traditionally advanced for
taking fingerprints and photographs, but with additional force because of the potentially greater preci-
sion of DNA sampling and matching methods.").
252 See supra 102 and accompanying text.
253 The actual DNA sample, after being analyzed, should be destroyed forthright, although the
generated profile should be held strictly for the duration of any ongoing criminal proceedings.
254 DNA retention policies for individuals who are convicted of a particular offense, versus indi-
viduals whose judicial proceedings terminate without a conviction, are not equivalent. Only the later is
discussed herein, whereas the former implicates many issues and concerns that are beyond the scope of
what is presently addressed.
255 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d) (2006).
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lematic policy, where many British citizens had their DNA collected and
recorded, yet were not ultimately convicted of the underlying offense. The
United Kingdom's DNA database by 2009 grew to over 5.3 million pro-
files, but approximately 200,000 profiles were from individuals who were
never convicted.256 Without a clear retention-expungement policy, the
United States similarly risks accumulating the profiles of many citizens
who have exited the criminal justice system without a conviction.
The burden of removing DNA profiles should rest with the government,
not with the individual, as the government collected the sample, indicted
and prosecuted the individual, and yet failed to satisfy the burden of prov-
ing that the individual was guilty of the charged crime. Paralleling Scot-
land's "fair and proportionate" system,257 profiles should be preserved only
for individuals indicted for a crime with no statute of limitation, provided
investigatory and prosecutorial attempts remain active.
A narrow retention system is loyal to the holdings in Knights and Sam-
son258 because this would tie DNA profiles to an individual's status as a
defendant before conviction. An individual's entry into the criminal justice
system eviscerates an equivalent privacy expectation from that of an indi-
vidual in the general public. 259 However, an individual's privacy expecta-
tion changes depending on how he exits the criminal justice system. Con-
viction further restricts privacy expectations. Anything less than conviction
should restore privacy expectations to those enjoyed by the general public.
Restricting the retention period and providing for automatic expungement,
limits DNA collection-retention to the extent needed to advance the gov-
ernment objective, and, in doing so, reasonably balances individual privacy
interests with government interests. This satisfies the goal of furthering
government's law enforcement interests, while curtailing any potential
government abuses, and, in doing so, is consistent with prevailing Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
E. Required Showing to Overcome the Balance in Favor of the
Government.
Three possible showings allow for the Government's presumption in fa-
vor of collecting DNA before conviction to be overcome. The first two
possible means of overcoming this presumption are axiomatic: (1) the fail-
256 Supra note 187.
257 Supranote201.
258 Supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
259 Supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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ure by the government to consistently adhere to all the four attributes; or
(2) the repeated and consistent abuses of DNA collection by the govern-
ment.
The third possible means would be to challenge pre-conviction DNA
collection on the basis that, given the advent of further scientific advances,
there is a less intrusive means to accomplish all the objective satisfied by
present DNA collection. This requirement ensures that DNA collection is
not lightly cast aside and recognizes the legitimate and real benefits provid-
ed by a DNA system, and that in the future, like fingerprinting, society at
large may recognize the circumscribed DNA collection regime as a rea-
sonable intrusion on privacy. Nevertheless, it still permits any existing
DNA collection system to be supplanted by a system that is equally effec-
tive, yet lessens the impact on individual privacy. This third option ensures
that DNA collection always is amended to operate in the least intrusive
means possible.
CONCLUSION
The value of DNA collection/profiling "lies as much, if not more, in its
ability to exclude the innocent as in its ability to convict the guilty." 260 The
widespread adoption of DNA collection/profiling testifies to its power and
value within the criminal justice system. Nevertheless, like others scientific
advances before it, DNA collection/profiling presents the challenge of bal-
ancing the greater needs of society at large, yet still safeguarding the rights
of the individual. Pre-conviction DNA collection/profiling is just one the
most recent scientific advances to challenge Fourth Amendment. The earli-
er described model of analysis offers a path by which to preserve Fourth
Amendment protections, balancing individual privacy interests, yet still ad-
vancing the interests of society in the need to effectively curb crime. The
methodology is constructed by building upon existing Fourth Amendment
doctrines and learning from both the successes and failures of DNA collec-
tion as utilized in the United Kingdom.
260 Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1275 (affirmed by [2004]
UKHL 39) (internal citations omitted).
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